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PRIVACY RIGHTS V. LAW ENFORCEMENT DIFFICULTIES:
THE CLASH OF COMPETING INTERESTS IN
NEW YORK v BEL TON
INTRODUCTION
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees a
personal right of privacy, free from unreasonable searches and government
invasions.' The interests protected by the fourth amendment, which re-
quires a search warrant in order to lawfully conduct a search of "persons,
houses, papers, and effects," 2 have been the subject of considerable litiga-
tion. 3 One important aspect of the development of fourth amendment re-
quirements and protections has been the creation of exceptions to the search
warrant requirement.
The United States Supreme Court has held that certain exigent circum-
stances obviate the search warrant requirement.4 For instance, the inherent
mobility and diminished privacy interests with respect to one's automobile
have been held to justify a warrantless search of an automobile on probable
cause. 5 Another exception arises for a search conducted contemporaneous to
a lawful arrest. 6 The boundaries of a warrantless search have been the sub-
ject of constant fluctuation.
7
The major decision defining the scope of a search incident to arrest,
Chimel v. Caiforni'a,8 represents the United States Supreme Court's attempt
at settling the vacillation and confusion in this area. However, major diffi-
culties have plagued the lower federal and state courts in their application
and interpretation of Chimel, under differing factual circumstances. 9 With
respect to automobiles, the lawful extent of a warrantless search has been
1. Under the fourth amendment a search into an area in which a party has a legitimate
expectation of privacy may be held unconstitutional. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967). A search generally involves exploratory investigation, or an invasion by a law officer. 1
W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.1(a) (1978 & Supp. 1980).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The importance of a search warrant was discussed in Mc-
Donald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948), which stated in part that, "the Fourth Amend-
ment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and the police. This was done ... so that
an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law." Id.
at 455.
3. See generally 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 1. This three-volume work, which deals exclu-
sively with the fourth amendment, reflects the enormous amount of litigation involved in the
evolution of rights under that amendment.
4. See infa note 15.
5. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925). See also United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982), where the United States Supreme
Court defined the permissible scope of a search under the automobile exception. See infa notes
117-121 and accompanying text.
6. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973). See infta text accompanying note 38.
7. "Few areas of the law have been as subject to shifting constitutional standards over the
last 50 years as that of the search 'incident to an arrest.' " Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752,
770 (1969) (White, J., dissenting). Set Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?
50 TEx. L. REV. 736, 740 (1972).
8. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
9. See infra note 10.
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intolerably confusing. 10 New York o. Beton ' I exemplifies the difficulties en-
countered by courts in considering what constitutes the scope of a search
incident to an arrest, when the locus of the arrest is an automobile.
This comment will explore the development of, and justifications for, a
permissible search incident to a lawful arrest, as well as the competing pri-
vacy interests and law enforcement responsibilities present in a fourth
amendment case. Furthermore, it will examine the possible effect of New
York v. Belton upon the law of search and seizure.
I. SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
A. Early Hzstoq'
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.'
2
This amendment guarantees to all citizens a personal right of privacy, free
from unreasonable governmental searches and invasions. The fourth
amendment does not prohibit all searches, only those that are unreasona-
ble.' 3 When a search is unreasonable as a matter of law, the exclusionary
rule, which precludes the use of illegally obtained evidence, is activated. 14
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that "searches
conducted without the authority of a search warrant are per se unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment subject only to a few specifically established
and delineated exceptions."1' 5 These specific exceptions are "jealously and
carefully drawn."1 6 Proof of exigent circumstances or the existence of an-
other exception obviates the warrant requirement.'
7
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the application of the search-inci-
dent-to-arrest exception have resulted in constantly shifting methods of anal-
ysis.' 8 The Court has been unable to establish a strong precedent for
10. Compare United States v. Sanders, 631 F.2d 1309 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Dixon, 558 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1977); andIn re Kiser, 419 F.2d 1134 (8th Cir. 1969); with United
States v. Benson, 631 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Rigales, 630 F.2d 364 (5th Cir.
1980); and Thompson v. State, 488 P.2d 944 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
11. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
13. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886).
14. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See infra notes 53-67 and accompanying text.
15. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnotes omitted). The exceptions to
the warrant requirement include: I) exigent circumstances, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967); 2) automobile searches, United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982); Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); 3) automobile
inventory searches, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976); 4) "stop and frisk"
searches, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); 5) consent searches, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218 (1973); 6) "plain view," Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); and
7) search incident to a lawful custodial arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
16. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971) (quoting Jones v. United States,
357 U.S. 493, 499 (1956)).
17. McDonald v. United States, 355 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
18. Set general4y Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., con-
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application in cases arising under this exception. This inability has gener-
ated criticism focusing on the confusion and unpredictability of the
decisions. 19
The groundwork for the search-incident-to-arrest exception may be
found in dicta of several Supreme Court decisions. 20 This dicta became the
foundation for the decision in Marron v. United States ,2 1 which held there is a
"right without a warrant contemporaneously to search the place," 22 in order
to find and seize evidence of crime. This new reasoning was subsequently
held inapplicable when the circumstances of the arrest allowed the arresting
officers to obtain a search warrant.
23
The pendulum swung towards further extension of the scope of the
search incident to arrest in what were to become the two most influential
decisions in this area for almost twenty years. In Harris v. United States,24 the
Court sustained a warrantless search of an entire four-room apartment. The
Court noted that "[t]he opinions . . . recognized that the search incident to
arrest may, under appropriate circumstances extend beyond the person of
the one arrested to include the premises under his immediate control."
25
Finding that Harris commanded exclusive control over the entire four-room
apartment, the Court emphasized the reasonableness approach.2 6 The Har-
rzs Court also considered the nature of the objects of the search in conclud-
ing that both the intensity and length of the search were reasonable. 2 7
United States v. Rabtnowitz 28 strengthened the Harris principle of reasona-
bleness. This decision upheld the search of a desk, safe, and file cabinets
contained in a one-room office where the arrest occurred. Applying the
"reasonableness of all the circumstances test," 29 in upholding the search, the
curring); Aaronson & Wallace, A Reconsideration of the Fourth Amendment's Doctrine of Search Incident
to Arrest, 64 GEo. L.J. 53 (1975); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349 (1974); Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudzhaton and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyer-
ing, 48 IND. L.J. 329 (1973).
19. See generally Dworkin, supra note 18.
20. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (upheld the government's right to
search the person, incident to arrest, to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925) (upheld the right to seize whatever evidence is
found upon the arrestee's person or within his control); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30
(1925) (upheld the right to search the place of arrest to find weapons or evidence of crime). For
the early development of fourth amendment rights, see generally N. LASSON, THE HISTORY
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION,
51-78 (1937).
21. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
22. Id. at 199.
23. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 358 (1931). See also Trupiano v.
United States, 334 U.S. 699, 710 (1948) (there is a prohibition against general exploratory
searches).
24. 331 U.S. 145 (1947), overruled, Chimel v. United States, 395 U.S. 768 (1968).
25. 331 U.S. at 151.
26. "[O]nly unreasonable searches and seizures . . . come within the constitutional inter-
dict. The test of reasonableness cannot be stated in rigid and absolute terms." Id. at 150.
27. "The same meticulous investigation which would be appropriate in a search for two
small cancelled checks could not be considered reasonable where agents are seeking a stolen
automobile or illegal still." Id. at 152.
28. 339 U.S. 56 (1950), overruled, Chimel v. United States, 395 U.S. 768 (1968).
29. The Court stated that "[the relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a
search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable." 339 U.S. at 66. "The recurring ques-
tinnq nf thte rnrnAhl.n, n c - ,i A :_ C ... -....-.. _f
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Court found no unreasonable extension beyond the area of the arrestee's
immediate control.
30
The Harris-Rabinowitz principle, as applied by the lower courts, did not
limit the scope of a permissible search to places where an arrestee could ob-
tain a weapon or destroy evidence. The major limitation that evolved in
subsequent cases interpreting Harris and Rabinowitz was the restriction of the
search to the premises where the defendant was arrested.
3
Theories based upon control and possession allowed the lower federal
and state courts to uphold substantially intrusive searches. 3 2 As applied by
these courts, the Harrs-Rabtnowitz principle did not entail inquiry into the
arrestee's ability to control the area subject to search.
33
B. Chimel v. California: The Warren Court's Attempt to Enunciate a Rule
The scope of a search incident to arrest, as developed in the Harris-Rabi-
nowitz decisions and in lower court interpretations, was drastically curtailed
by the Warren Court. Ch'mel v. Californta 34 was, the pinnacle of the Court's
decisions broadening fourth amendment protections. This decision re-
stricted the scope of a search incident to arrest to that area within the arres-
tee's immediate control. 35 The law enforcement officers in Chimel obtained
an arrest warrant, but no search warrant. Concurrent with Chimel's lawful
arrest at his home, the officers conducted a full search of his residence.
36
The Court, in stressing the importance of procuring a search warrant,
recognized that certain exigent circumstances created exemptions from the
fourth amendment's search warrant requirement. 37 The test the Court es-
poused allowed the arresting officer the authority:
[T]o search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons
that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his
escape. . . . In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting
officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person
in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area
each case." Id. at 63 (construing Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357
(1931)).
30. 339 U.S. at 64.
31. See, e.g., James v. Louisiana, 382 U.S. 36 (1965) (search of a home invalidated when
defendant arrested several blocks away); United States v. Preston, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) (search
must be contemporaneous to arrest); Smith v. United States, 254 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(search upstairs, arrest downstairs). See 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 6.3 (1978 &
Supp. 1980).
32. 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 31, § 7.1 at 498.
33. Id See, e.g., Arwine v. Bannan, 346 F.2d 458 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 882 (1965)
(search of automobile while arrestee was handcuffed); Crawford v. Bannan, 336 F.2d 505 (6th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 955 (1965) (search of passenger area while arrestee was in squad
car); United States ex rel Foose v. Rundle, 269 F. Supp. 1017 (E.D. Penn. 1967), aj'd per curnm,
389 F.2d 54 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 914 (1968) (search of automobile upheld as a search
incident to arrest when arrestee was in police custody at station house).
34. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). For detailed discussions of Chinet, see Aaronson & Wallace, supra
note 18; Amsterdam, supra note 18; Comment, Scope of Searches Incident to Arrest, 43 U. CoLO. L.
REV. 63 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Seope of Searches]; Comment, Search and Seirure-Permisible
Seope of a Search Incident to a Valid Custodiat Arrest, 8 U. RICH. L. REV. 610 (1974).
35. 395 U.S. at 763.
36. The officers, accompanied by Chimel's wife, searched the three-bedroom home, includ-
ing the garage and the attic. Id. at 754.
37. Id. at 762.
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into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or
evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule....
There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the arrestee's
person and the area 'within his immediate control'-construing
that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
3 8
Chimd represents the Warren Court's endeavor to balance the law en-
forcement interests of the state with the privacy interests of the individual,
3 9
and to clarify the "quagmire" 4° that had developed around the search-inci-
dent-to-arrest exception. The Chimde holding, in overruling the Hams-Rabb'o-
witz principle, set down a sweeping guideline governing searches incident to
arrests and formulated a standard for application by law enforcement offi-
cials. The manner in which this principle was enunciated established few
positive guidelines for law enforcement officials to follow. 4 1 This lack of pos-
itive direction from Chimel resulted in the Supreme Court granting certiorari
in numerous subsequent cases to clarify Chimel.
42
The difficulty the lower courts were having with the lack of positive
guidelines from the Court partially arose from differing interpretations of the
issue in Chimel. The issue in Chinel was whether the area subject to search,
at the moment of the search, was accessible to the arrestee. 43  However,
lower federal and state courts interpreted the issue to be whether the arrestee
could have reached the area subject to the search at any time. This interpre-
tation resulted in an expansion of the area considered subject to the immedi-
38. Id. at 763. For cases applying the Chimd principle to automobile searches, see supra
note 10, and United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S.
800 (1974); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973).
39. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
40. See LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court. Further Ventures into the "Quagmire,"
8 CRIM. L. BULL. 9 (1972). Professor LaFave remarked that after Chimel, "it would seem that a
full search of the vehicle. . . could no longer be upheld as a search incident to arrest," placing
the automobile exception in effect. Id. at 18.
41. For criticism of the Chimel holding, see generally Aaronson & Wallace, supra note 18.
The authors maintain Chimel lacks a defensible basis, resulting in inconsistent application by
both the lower courts and law enforcement officials. Chimel left this area of the law ambiguous
-and uncertain. Id See also Carrington, Chimel v. California-A Po/e Response, 45 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 559 (1970). When the police searched Chimel's house they were actually within the
scope of Harris-Rabinowitz. Id. at 564. Carrington also suggested that Chimel's overbreadth re-
sulted in two problems: 1) police do not know what conduct is appropriate; and 2) judges
applying Chimel have great latitude for interpretation. Id. at 568.
42. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973) applied the Chimel standard in holding that an arresting officer has authority to search
the person of an arrestee incident to an arrest for a traffic violation. The Court found that the
person of the arrestee falls within the area of the arrestee's immediate control. The searches at
issue in both Robinson and Gustafson did not extend beyond the arrestee's person.
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), addressed whether a footlocker placed in an
automobile trunk may be searched two hours after arrest, as incident to arrest. Finding Chimel
inapplicable to the facts, the Supreme Court held:
Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other personal property not
immediately associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive control, and
there is no longer any danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to
seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an incident
of the arrest.
Id. at 15.
43. 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 31, § 7.1 at 501.
1982]
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ate control of the arrestee. 4 4 In light of lower court interpretations of Chbmel,
New York v. Belton presented an opportunity for the Court to clarify the defi-
nition of the area within the immediate control of the arrestee, when the
locus of the arrest is an automobile.
4 5
C. Clash of Competing Interests
Fourth amendment cases place constitutionally protected privacy inter-
ests against the responsibilities of law enforcement officers to combat
crime.46 The two interests are positioned in such a manner that the protec-
tion of one interest often curtails the other.4 7 It is the court's responsibility
to balance the public's interest in safety against the individual's right to pri-
vacy free from arbitrary interference by police officers.
Law enforcement officials' decisions to search subsequent to a lawful
arrest are necessarily swift ad hoc judgments, leaving little room for them to
contemplate the legality of their actions.4 3 Therefore, in order for policemen
to work within constitutional limitations, the Court must provide guide-
lines. 49 Since the fourth amendment regulates law enforcement officials in
their daily conduct, its requirements need "to be expressed in terms that are
readily applicable by the police." 50
Juxtaposed against the duties of law enforcement officials are the per-
sonal interests protected by the fourth amendment. Individuals are guaran-
teed freedom from unreasonable invasions of legitimate privacy interests. 5 1
These privacy interests are "indispensable to the full enjoyment of personal
security, personal liberty and private property . . . [and] they are to be re-
garded as the very essence of constitutional liberty."1
5 2
D. The Exclusionagy Rule
Seizure of evidence in violation of an individual's fourth amendment
rights invokes the exclusionary rule. The rule bars the prosecution from in-
troducing illegally seized evidence at trial. 53 Currently the major rationale
44. United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666, 673 (5th Cir. 1973) (Goldberg, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), cert. denied,.419 U.S. 831 (1974).
45. 453 U.S. at 459.
46. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 431 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring).
47. This balancing process constitutis a tremendous challenge to those in the criminal jus-
tice system. See genera/y LaFave, supra note 40.
48. See Carrington, supra note 41, at 560.
49. It has been urged that reviewing courts need to consider the realities of the situation.
Id. at 567.
50. See LaFave, supra note 40, at 141-42.
[I]f the rules are impossible of application . . . the result may be the sustaining of
motions to suppress . . . . [B]ut this can hardly be taken as proof. . . people are
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures. . . . Rather, that security can only be realized if the police are acting under
a set of rules which. . . makes it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand
as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement.
Id. at 142.
51. See supra note I and accompanying text. Although any search is an invasion of privacy,
it is only unreasonable searches that are constitutionally prohibited.
52. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921).
53. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Seegenerally, W. LAFAVE, supra note 1, at §§ 1.1-
1.2, 3-3.9; Amsterdam, supra note 18; Kaplan, The Ltmis of the Exctusonagy Rute, 26 STAN. L.
REv. 1027 (1974); Wright, supra note 7.
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of the rule lies in its potential deterrent effect, 54 however, the preservation of
judicial integrity is another suggested justification.
55
The trend towards the deterrence rationale as the sole justification for
the exclusionary rule has lead to the erosion of the rule's application. There
is a growing tendency to find that the harmful consequences of the rule out-
weigh any deterrent effect, 56 as well as a tendency to hesitate in applying the
rule to anything less than flagrant or willfull violations of fourth amendment
rights.57 The exclusionary rule has been held inapplicable in grand jury
proceedings,5 impeachment of witnesses, 59 actions under statutes subse-
quently held invalid,6 ° and administrative proceedings.
6 1
The criticisms directed at the exclusionary rule,6 2 coupled with the cur-
rent trend by the Court, suggest that modification of the exclusionary rule
may be imminent. 63 Justice White's dissent in Stone o. Powe164 proposed bar-
54. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). See generally United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338 (1974); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
55. The exclusionary rule's preservation ofjudicial integrity is based upon the idea that the
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence will bar the courts from becoming accomplices with
police actions violating constitutional rights the courts are required to protect. See Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
56. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). Many studies have attempted
to evaluate the impact of the exclusionary rule. The result of these studies is that no one "has
yet been able to establish with any assurance whether the rule has any deterrent effect .... "
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 450 n.22 (1976). See generally Canon, Is the Exclusiona Rule
in Failing Health? Some New Data and A Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681
(1974); Spiotto, Search and Seizure. An Empirical Study of the Exclusionar Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J.
LEG. STUD. 243 (1973).
It has been asserted that "the costs of the exclusionary rule are immediately apparent,
while its benefits are only conjectural. When courts apply the rule, law enforcement officials are
deprived of incriminating evidence. In contrast, any police misconduct that would have oc-
curred but for the deterrent effect of the suppression order is purely speculative." Mertens and
Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule. Deregulating the Police and Derailing
the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 394 (1981).
See generally Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Setzure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665
(1970); Comment, The Erosion of the Exclusionary Rule Under the Burger Court, 33 BAYLOR L. REV.
352 (1981); Comment, Broadening the Scope of a Search Incident to Arrest.- The Burger Court's Retreat
from Chimel, 24 EMORY L.J. 151 (1975).
57. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 415, 419 (1971) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
58. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
59. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
60. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
61. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
62. See Bernardi, The Exclusionary Rule. Is a Good Faith Standard Needed to Preserve a Liberal
Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 30 DE PAUL L. REV. 51 (1980); Burger, Who Will Watch the
Watchman?, 14 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1964); Note, The Erosion of the Exclusionary Rule Under the Burger
Court, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 363 (1980).
It has been argued that the exclusionary rule fails to deter because: 1) The deterrent effect
operates only when police officers know what specific rules apply; 2) The officer suffers no pen-
alty from his actions, often having no knowledge of the consequences; 3) It fails to reach non-
evidence-gathering activities. See Bernardi, supra; Burger, supra.
On the other hand, one commentator has asserted that the exclusionary rule is "indispensa-
ble to the development of law by lower courts. Suppression litigation provides the principal
occasion for appellate courts to clarify and refashion the broad principles of the fourth amend-
ment; it also permits development of coherent standards through case-by-case adjudication of
more fact-specific questions." Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 56, at 402.
63. An important consideration for examining the future of the exclusionary rule is the
effect Justice O'Connor will have on the Court. Although she has not voiced any intention to
overrule the exclusionary rule, during her confirmation hearings she remarked that "evidence
1982]
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ring the rule's application in those circumstances where the evidence at issue
was seized by an officer acting in the good faith belief that his conduct com-
ported with existing law and having reasonable grounds for this belief.
65
This "good faith" rule is based upon the assumption that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule is the deterrence of willful police misconduct. It is argued
that when the officer does not know his actions are illegal or he acts under
the mistaken assumption that they are legal, the exclusionary rule has no
deterrent effect. 66 Whether it is perceived as an exception to or modification
of the exclusionary rule, the "good faith" standard can be seen as protecting
individual rights only when deterrence of illegal police conduct can be effec-
tively achieved.
6 7
Although the United States Supreme Court has not yet adopted the
good faith standard suggested by Justice White,68 the Fifth Circuit, in United
States v. Williams,69 recently proclaimed its acceptance of this change in the
exclusionary rule. The Fifth Circuit modified the exclusionary rule to the
may not need to be excluded if standards were applied that take into account the good faith of
the police." Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 56, at 370 (quoting Confimnation Hearng of Sandra
Day O'Connor Before the Senate judiciary Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 143 (Sept. 9, 1981)).
Because at least four other justices have voiced their dissatisfaction with .the exclusionary
rule, the addition of Justice O'Connor to the Court may create a majority in favor of overruling
the exclusionary rule. See California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916 (1979) (Burger, CJ., Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 538 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (suggesting a
good faith exception); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-12 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in
part) (suggesting a sliding scale test based upon the flagrancy of the fourth amendment viola-
tion).
In defense of the good faith exception, several advantages have been mentioned. The good
faith standard would provide for judicial review of fourth amendment questions, would main-
tain judicial integrity and public respect, and would encourage the states' formation of alterna-
tive procedures of deterrence. Bernardi, supra note 62, at 10 1-03.
Critics of the good faith exception maintain that it would 1) curtail the fourth amendment
protections, Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 56; 2) would encourage law enforcement offi-
cials' ignorance of the law, Kaplan, supra note 53; and 3) would diminish whatever deterrent
impact the exclusionary rule may have; Ball, &ood Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The "Reason-
able" Exception to the Exclusionaty Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635 (1978).
64. 428 U.S. 456, 538 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); see Ball, supra note 63; Bernardi, supra
note 62; Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 56.
65. 428 U.S. at 538.
66. Id. at 539.
67. Another proposed modification of the exclusionary rule is based upon the concept of
substantial violations of an individual's fourth amendment rights. A motion to suppress would
be granted only if the trial court found the alleged violations to be gross, willful, and prejudicial
to the accused. In its determination of the substantiality of the violation, the trial court would
be required to take into account all circumstances concerning the proposed violations,
including:
(a) the extent of deviation from lawful conduct;
(b) the extent to which the violation was willful;
(c) the extent to which privacy was invaded;
(d) the extent to which exclusion will tend to prevent violations of this Code;
(e) whether, but for the violation, the things seized would have been discovered;
and
(f) the extent to which the violation prejudiced the moving party's ability to
support his motion, or to defend himself in the proceeding in which the things seized
are sought to be offered in evidence against him.
A.L.I., A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 150.3 (Proposed Official Draft,
1975).
68. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 456, 538 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
69. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
The arresting officer was found to have a reasonable belief, motivated by good faith, that he
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extent -that evidence is admissible "where it is discovered by officers in the
course of actions that are taken in good faith and in the reasonable though
mistaken belief that they are authorized."7 0 This holding, grounded on the
belief that that the exclusionary rule's purpose is to deter only willful or
flagrant violations of fourth amendment rights, may have a considerable im-
pact on the status of the exclusionary rule in other jurisdictions.
7 1
II. FACTS OF NEW YORK V BELTON
Patrolman Douglas Nicot, observed an automobile traveling at an ex-
cessive rate of speed as it passed his patrol car on a New York thruway.
72
After stopping the automobile, he asked the driver for his driver's license and
the automobile's registration. As the driver rolled down the window, Nicot
smelled burnt marijuana and noticed an envelope marked "Supergold" on
the floor of the car. Nicot directed the four occupants to get out of the auto-
mobile and then proceeded to "frisk" them. 73 Nicot had only one pair of
handcuffs which led him to believe it was necessary to split the four men into
separate areas of the thruway. They were positioned in such a manner as to
preclude physical touching, while still being in close proximity to the two-
door vehicle.
74
The officer retrieved the envelope marked "Supergold" from the car's
interior. This envelope contained traces of marijuana, leading to the arrest
of the four men for possession of marijuana. After the arrestees were read
their Miranda75 rights, they were individually searched for further contra-
had the authority to arrest. Although this officer did not have the authority to arrest, his good
faith belief was held to be sufficient to preclude the exercise of the exclusionary rule. Id. at 844.
For an in depth analysis of United States v. Williams, see Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra
note 56; Comment, Exclusionay Rule.- Good Faith Exception-The Fi/th Circutt's Approach in United
States v. Williams, 15 GEo. L. REV. 487 (1981); Note, United States v. Williams, 13 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 179 (1981).
70. 622 F.2d at 840.
71. Id. This "good faith" exception was codified by the Colorado Legislature:
(1) Evidence which is otherwise admissible in a criminal proceeding shall not be
suppressed by the trial court if the court determines that the evidence was seized by a
peace officer, as a result of a good faith mistake or of a technical violation ....
(2)(a) "Good faith mistake" means a reasonable judgmental error concerning
the existence of facts which if true would be sufficient to constitute probable cause
(b) "Technical violation" means a reasonable good faith reliance upon a statute
which is later ruled unconstitutional, a warrant which is later invalidated due to a
good faith mistake, or a court precedent which is later overruled.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-308 (1973), as amended by 1981 Colo. Sess. Laws, Ch. 188. The United
States Congress has also considered a codification of some form of the good faith exception. See
S. 101, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. 751, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
72. Nicot approximated the rate of speed to be 75 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour
zone. Brief for Respondent, App. at 13, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
73. Probable cause to arrest exists when the officer feels it is more likely than not that a
crime has been committed and was committed by the person to be arrested. Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). In the Belton case, the odor of the marijuana supplied sufficient
probable cause for a valid arrest. Therefore, the validity of the arrest was not at issue.
74. Brief for Respondent, App. at 21.
75. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), which held that an individual who is taken
into custody or otherwise significantly deprived of his freedom should be afforded the following
procedural safeguards to protect the privilege against self-incrimination:
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent,
that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right
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band. A search of the interior of the two-door vehicle revealed approxi-
mately eight marijuana cigarettes as well as five outer garments in the back
seat. One of these garments was ajacket with zippered pockets belonging to
Roger Belton, one of the four arrestees. A search of the zippered pockets
revealed a rolled-up twenty-dollar bill containing suspected cocaine.
76
Roger Belton was subsequently indicted by the Ontario County Grand
Jury for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fifth degree.
The trial court denied his motion to suppress the cocaine as the fruit of an
illegal search. 77 The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court
unanimously affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress. 78 This lower
court found the search of Belton's jacket justified as a search incident to an
arrest. The New York court relied on the Chimel holding that incident to an
arrest, a search may be made of the area within the arrestee's immediate
control. 79 The court described this area as including effects of the arrestee
that are "ready to hand."' 0
The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, hold-
ing that under the circumstances of the arrest the search was unreasonable.
8 '
The court asserted that once Belton had been removed from the vehicle and
placed under arrest, "a search of the interiors of a private receptacle safely
within the exclusive custody and control of the police may not be upheld as
incident to his [Belton's] arrest."'8 2 In spite of his arrest, Belton retained a
strong privacy interest in his jacket. Furthermore the court found that be-
cause Belton was effectively neutralized and his jacket was in the exclusive
custody and control of the officer, there was no possibility for the destruction
of evidence or access to weapons. Hence, the court concluded that a search
warrant was required prior to commencing a search of a jacket, under these
circumstances.
8 3
III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING
In a five-to-one-to-three decision,8 4 the United States Supreme Court
reversed the holding of the New York Court of Appeals. The Court stressed
the importance of the fourth amendment requirement that a search warrant
to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Id. at 478-79.
76. Brief for Respondent, App. at 21. The officer took the jacket from the back seat of the
arrestees' car into the patrol car. Id. at 50, 55.
77. People v. Belton, 68 A.D.2d 198, 416 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1979). Belton preserved his claim
that the warrantless search of his jacket violated his fourth amendment rights.
78. 68 A.D.2d at 200, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 925.
79. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
80. 68 A.D.2d at 200, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 924 (citing People v. Weintraub, 35 N.Y.2d 351,
354, 361 N.Y.S.2d 897, 900, 320 N.E.2d 636, 638 (1974)).
81. People v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447, 429 N.Y.S.2d 574, 407 N.E.2d 420 (1980).
82. Id. at 453, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 577, 407 N.E.2d at 423.
83. Id.
84. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). Justice Stewart wrote the opinion of the
Court in which Chief Justice Burger, Justices Blackmun and Powell joined. Justice Rehnquist
filed a separate opinion joining in the opinion of the Court. Justice Stevens filed a separate
opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion in which Jus-
tice Marshall joined. Justice White filed a separate dissent in which Justice Marshall joined.
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be obtained prior to the initiation of a search. 85 The Court noted that exi-
gent circumstances could render the search warrant requirement unneces-
sary.86 However, the Court stated that the scope of a search must be strictly
limited by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.
8 7
The majority, after considering the difficulty of applying Cht'mel,88 rec-
ognized the need for a "bright line" rule89 to guide police officers in their
daily activities.90 The Court held that the interior of the automobile is ar-
guably part of the area within the immediate control of the arrestee, when
the arrestee has been a recent occupant, and that the "articles inside the
relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of the automobile
are in fact generally, if not inevitably, within 'the area into which an arrestee
might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary item.' "91 As a result,
the majority concluded that when a policeman has effectuated a valid "cus-
todial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporane-
ous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that
automobile." 92 Consequently, the Court held that any containers within the
interior of a vehicle may also be searched when a recent occupant is the
subject of a lawful arrest.
93
While extending the scope of the search to containers, the majority spe-
cifically limited the authority to search only the interior of the automobile.
94
Justice Stewart noted that a lawful custodial arrest supersedes any privacy
interest the arrestee may have in any container within the interior of the
automobile. 95 However, a search extending beyond the interior of the auto-
85. Id. at 457.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 458. Justice Stewart suggested that the Chimel principle is difficult to apply. The
police, with limited expertise and time to reflect on social and law enforcement considerations,
require a single, familiar standard. Id See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
89. The majority called for the adoption of a single familiar standard; however, it was the
dissent that coined the expression "bright line" rule. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority,
noted that the protections of the fourth and fourteenth amendments "can only be realized if the
police are acting under a set of rules, which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a
correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest
of law enforcement." 453 U.S. at 458 (quoting LaFave, "Case by Case Adjudication"versus "Stan-
dardzediProcedures'" The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 127, 142).
90. 453 U.S. at 458. Justice Stewart appeared to be persuaded by several commentators.
Id. See generally LaFave, supra note 89. LaFave stressed that the fourth amendment's purpose is
to regulate the police. Theses standards of regulation should be "expressed in terms that are
readily applicable by police in the context of the law enforcement activities .... " Id. at 141.
See also Amsterdam, supra note 18; Carrington, supra note 41; Dworkin, supra note 18; LaFave,
Improving Pohe Performance Through the Exclusiona y Rule-Part II" Defining the Norms and Training
the Polie, 30 Mo. L. REV. 566 (1965).
91. 453 U.S. at 460.
92. Id.
93. "If the passenger compartment is within reach of the arrestee, so also will containers in
it be within his reach." Id. However broad this may seem, the Court attempted to limit its
holding to the circumstances involved in Belton. The Court stated in a footnote that "[olur
holding today does no more than determine the meaning of Chime/'s principles in this particular
and problematic context. It in no way alters the fundamental principles established in the
Chimel case regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests." Id. at n.3.
94. Id. at 460-61 n.4. Luggage, boxes, clothing, and other receptacles, as well as the open
or closed glove compartment, are now legitimate objects of a warrantless search of an automo-
bile's interior, incident to the arrest of a recent occupant. Id.
95. 453 U.S. at 461. The character of the container is irrelevant. No requirement of prob-
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mobile would seemingly violate an individual's right against unreasonable
searches under the fourth amendment warrant requirement.
96
Justice Brennan's dissent 97 agreed with the majority's use of the search-
incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement, 98 however, he had
difficulty accepting the majority's expansion of the Chinel proposition. In
Justice Brennan's opinion, the majority's desire to formulate a police guide-
line ignored the underlying policy rationales originally justifying the search-
incident-to-arrest exception. He assessed the Ch'mel standard as narrowly
tailored to address the concerns of "the safety of the arresting officer and the
preservation of easily concealed or destructible evidence." 99 His analysis of
Chimel placed a "temporal and a spatial limitation on searches incident to
arrest."'0 Justice Brennan concluded his dissent by asserting that the ma-
jority "failed to offer any principles to guide the police and the courts in
their application of the new rule to nonroutine situations."10 1
IV. ANALYSIS OF NEW YORK V BEL TON
A. Analytt'cal Weaknesses of the Behon Decision
New York v. Be/ton represents a significant expansion of the scope of a
search incident to an arrest, when the locus of the arrest is an automobile.
The Court utilized the Ch'mel standard 10 2 in evaluating the search of Bel-
ton's jacket.'0 3 Where Chime served as a limitation on the arresting officer's
able cause is required by the Court. "A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is
a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search inci-
dent to the arrest requires no additional justification." Id. (quoting United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)).
96. 453 U.S. at 460-61 n.4. The Court dismissed the New York Court of Appeals' conclu-
sion that the jacket was in the exclusive control of the police. But see Chadwick v. United States,
433 U.S. 1 (1977). This case presented issues distinguishable from Belton. See supra note 44.
97. 453 U.S. at 463.
98. Id. at 466.
99. Id. at 465 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's major criticism rested with the
Court's extension of authority to search when the justifications that create this authority are
absent. His analysis assumed that the arrestees, while in custody, had no opportunity to reach
for evidence or a weapon. This may be a dubious assumption when the facts associated with the
instant case are considered. In Belton, there were four suspects and one arresting officer who
possessed only one set of handcuffs.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 470-71 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan suggested that the majority
failed to address some of the following issues: How long after the arrest must the search be
conducted? What is included in "interior?" Does the holding in Be/ton apply only to
automobiles? Does it matter whether the police established probable cause to arrest before or
after the suspect left his car? Does the Belton rule apply to any container even if it could not
hold a weapon or evidence of a crime? Id. at 470.
102. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See supra text accompanying note 38.
103. 453 U.S. 453passim (1981). The automobile exception could have been the basis for
evaluating the Be/ton search. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. As Justice Stevens noted
in his dissenting opinion in a case decided the same day as Be/ton, "[I]nstead of relying on the
automobile exception to uphold the search of respondent's [Belton's] jacket pocket, the Court
takes an extraordinary dangerous detour to reach the same result by adopting an admittedly
new rationale applicable to every 'lawful custodial arrest' of the occupant of an automobile."
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 449-50 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In a plurality opin-
ion, the Robbbru Court held unconstitutional the opening of opaque packages found by the po-
lice in the recessed luggage compartment of the suspect's car. Robbins, unlike Be/ton, involved a
warrantless search pursuant to the automobile exception. In light of the holding in Robbins, it is
doubtful whether the Be/ton search would have been upheld if the Court had decided the case
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authority to search incident to a lawful arrest, the Be/ton holding expands the
scope of these searches to pre-Chi'nel levels.' 0 4 While Belton purports to be an
application of Ch'mel to its specific facts t0 5 the effect of its holding serves as
justification for a potentially unlimited search subsequent to a lawful
arrest. 106
The majority in Be/ton substantially departed from the Chimhel holding
by declaring that an open or closed container within the interior of an auto-
mobile may be lawfully searched, "since the justification for the search is not
that the arrestee has no privacy interest in the container, but that the lawful
custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee
may have."' 1 7 Such a justification ignores prior foundations upon which a
search incident to an arrest was based-the need to protect police officers
and to prevent the destruction of evidence.' 08 By ignoring the foundations
which limited the scope of a search incident to arrest, it is conceivable that
the Be/ton principle of subordinating privacy interests once a lawful arrest
has been effected will be applied to factual situations beyond the context of
the automobile. 10 9
While there may exist a need for a "bright line" rule in the often un-
clear area of searches incident to arrest," t0 the Court failed to limit its deci-
sion in a manner which would serve to protect an individuals' privacy
interests in containers placed in an automobile."' The Court allows a
search incident to arrest to become a complete justification for a search of
the entire interior of an automobile. The Court could have required the
police officers to have probable cause to search a container found during the
lawful search of the automobile. "1 2 This probable cause requirement would
serve the interests of the law enforcement officials, for if articulable facts
substantiating that the necessity of a search existed, thereby establishing
probable cause, officers could search the container. t 13 This probable cause
requirement could therefore serve as a necessary compromise between law
enforcement duties and privacy interests of the individual.
under the automobile exception. But see United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982) and in/a,
notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
104. 453 U.S. at 460. See supra note 33.
105. Id. n.3.
106. Id. at 468 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See zhf/a text accompanying note 114.
107. Id. at 461. This proposition was specifically rejected by the Court in Chirmel. 395 U.S.
at 766 n. 12. The majority in Belton dispensed with precedents by not classifying Roger Belton's
zippered pocket as a closed container in which there was a reasonable expectation of privacy.
108. 395 U.S. at 763.
109. State v. Gomez, 632 P.2d 586 (Colo. 1981). The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the
search of a motel room as incident to arrest, through its application of the Chimel principles to
the facts, while citing Belton.
110. See supra note 90.
111. See 453 U.S. at 460-61 n.4. The Court seemed to ignore that "[tihe scope of [a] search
must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permis-
sible." Id. at 2862 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969), where definite limitations were placed upon the warrantless searches).
112. One commentator has suggested this method to protect fourth amendment interests.
See Scope of Searches, supra note 34.
113. See generally Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 (1980) (upheld search and seizure of
evidence in automobile where police officer had probable cause to arrest the occupants and to
seize the incriminating items without a warrant).
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The Court's decision in Belton seems to erase the search warrant require-
ment while spatially expanding the scope of the authority to search.' 14 A
likely result of Belton is that once a lawful arrest is effected, a warrantless
search of an automobile will only rarely be held unconstitutional. The
search incident to the arrest could uncover evidence which would. give rise to
probable cause to search the remainder of the automobile under the automo-
bile exception to the search warrant requirement." 5  As previously dis-
cussed, Belton could be more appropriately limited and the competing
interests balanced by requiring that police officers establish probable cause
before searching containers within the interior of an automobile. However,
in its present form, Belton could lead to the establishment of probable cause
to search containers beyond the interior of an automobile. This leaves ques-
tions as to what would stop law enforcement officials from conducting a gen-
eral exploratory search.
Belton's expansion of the scope of a search incident to arrest as previ-
ously formulated under Chime could result in significant intrusions upon in-
dividual privacy interests. Where the Warren Court liberalized the
individual's fourth amendment protections, Belton is further evidence of the
Burger Court's refusal to expand and in some instances, willingness to limit,
the constitutional protections of the individual.
B. Impact of the Court's Use of Bright Line Rules
An in depth study of the last fifty years of fourth amendment case law is
not necessary to conclude that the entire area is permeated with confusion
and inconsistent decisions. Conflicting and differing applications of fourth
amendment principles to the same or similar factual patterns is a key expla-
nation for this confusion, as evidenced by the disparate holdings in Belton,
Robbins v. California, 1 16 and United States v. Ross. 1 7 The Court's failure to
114. 453 U.S. at 460.
115. Under the automobile exception, the enlarged search would be considered constitu-
tionally permitted. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. Under Ross, as it has expanded the
automobile exception, the officers only need probable cause to believe the object of the search
will be found in the container. Thus, an individual lawfully stopped on the highway, may have
significantly limited privacy interests. See infra note 117.
116. 453 U.S. 420 (1981). Robbins was stopped for erratic driving. After discovering that
the vehicle's registration was not in his wallet, he opened the door, whereupon the officers
smelled marijuana. Id. at 422. After Robbins was patted down, there was a search of the
passenger compartment which revealed a vial containing liquid as well as a package of mari-
juana. Robbins was placed in the patrol car while the officers searched the recessed luggage
compartment of the station wagon. The fruits of this search included a tote bag and two green
opaque packages. The packages were opened, revealing 15 pounds of marijuana. Robbins'
motions to suppress were denied by the trial court and he was convicted. Id.
Robbins v. Caiforna presented the issue of whether closed containers found during a lawful,
warrantless search, authorized under the automobile exception, may themselves be searched in
the absence of a warrant. Under Robbins, a closed container found during the lawful search of
an automobile, pursuant to the automobile exception, could not be opened without the author-
ity of a search warrant. The plurality opinion, written by Justice Stewart, held that a "closed
piece of luggage found in a lawfully searched car is constitutionally protected to the same extent
as are closed pieces of luggage found anywhere else." .453 U.S. at 425. The exact nature of the
container was considered unimportant as long as the container was closed, opaque, and mani-
festing an expectation of privacy. The court saw no need to distinguish between the relative
privacy interests in "personal" as opposed to "impersonal" effects. 453 U.S. at 426. However,
any container that clearly announced its contents was considered to be in plain view and there-
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apply a similar analysis to these cases, adds to the existing confusion in this
area of the law. I"
In Ross, the United States Supreme Court held that the scope of a war-
rantless search conducted under the authority of the automobile exception,
is to be "no narrower-and no broader-than the scope of a search author-
ized by a warrant supported by probable cause.' 19 The Court went on to
say that the scope of the search of an automobile under this exception is not
dependent upon the nature of the container that is suspected to be the locus
of the contraband. The only limit to this broad authority to search is found
in the requirement of probable cause to believe the container is the locus of
the object of the search'1
20
Belton expands the scope of a search incident to arrest at the expense of
certain privacy interests. Similarly, Ross expands the scope of the automo-
bile exception to include the search of the entire automobile and any con-
tents that may conceal the object of the search. Where Robbins recognized
the need to protect privacy interests during a search conducted pursuant to
the automobile exception, Belton and Ross subordinate these individual pri-
vacy interests when a search is conducted under the search incident to arrest
exception and the automobile exception, respectively.
12
The Court's use of "bright line" rules represents a significant departure
from the previous approach of case-by-case determinations.' 2 2 The case-by-
case approach has contributed to the confusion permeating fourth amend-
ment law, as well as to the confusion of law enforcement officials who have
fore manifesting no reasonable expectation of privacy, allowing for a search without a warrant.
Id
Where Belton expanded the scope of a search incident to arrest at the expense of certain
privacy interests, the Court in Robbtns refused to expand the automobile exception to include
the warrantless search of closed containers found in an automobile. Robbins recognized the need
to protect privacy interests during a search conducted pursuant to the automobile exception,
whereas Belton subordinated these privacy interests in a search conducted after a lawful arrest.
117. 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982). Ross was stopped based upon an informant's tip that he was
selling narcotics. The police officer discovered a bullet on the front seat of the car, and a pistol
in the glove compartment. After arresting Ross, one of the officers opened the trunk of the
automobile and discovered a closed paper bag, later found to contain heroin. A thorough
search of the car at the police station revealed a zippered leather pouch containing $3,200. The
District Court denied Ross' motion to suppress this evidence and he was convicted of possession
of heroin with intent to distribute. Id. at 2160.
118. Rather than formulate a single "bright line" rule applicable to the factual situations in
both cases, the Court handed down "bright line" rules that may be applied in either situation.
In Robbins it was not asserted that the search was the product of a search incident to arrest, as in
Briton. The Court will only decide the issues put forward by the parties. 453 at 452 n. 15 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). Therefore, what appears as opposite holdings is the product of two differ-
ent theories of fourth amendment law applied to similar factual situation. These two decisions
evidence the confusion that is widespread in the fourth amendment decisions. "Viewing similar
facts from entirely different perspectives need not lead to identical results." Id. at 430 (Powell,
J., concurring).
119. 102 S. Ct. at 2172.
120. Id.
121. The precedential weight of Robbins is questionable in light of Ross. The majority opin-
ion in Ross recognizing that the holding was inconsistent with Robbins, failed to specifically
overrule Robbins. Ross only rejected Robbins. Id. at 2172. In light of Ross' "bright line" rule, it
appears that while not specifically overruling Robbins, Ross has emasculated Robbins almost to-
tally. "[Tihe Court unambiguously overrules 'the disposition of Robbins' ... though it gingerly
avoids stating that it is overruling the case itself." Id. at 2181 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
122. St generally LaFave, supra note 89 at 142.
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been forced to second-guess how a court will subsequently analyze a particu-
lar fact situation.1 23 However, the use of "bright line" rules presents certain
difficulties.
The "bright line" rules set forth broad principles of law that can be
applied to all factual circumstances resulting in straightforward guidance for
both law enforcement officials and courts. 1 24 "Bright line" rules encourage
consistency among decisions, and do not require subjective decisions by the
officer in the field. However, it is conceivable that this type of mechanical
application may result in infringement upon individual privacy interests.
The courts are only required to assess whether the narrow facts of the case at
hand fit under the broad "bright line" rule without investigating facts that
could lead to an opposite result. These types of rules may contribute further
to the current confusion in the fourth amendment law. When a court may
apply one of several constitutional tests to similar factual circumstances
when assessing the validity of a search, and each is generally associated with
a predetermined result, confusion is inevitable. In this context, the law en-
forcement officer is also forced to guess which test the Court will apply.'
2 5
Although the case-by-case approach leads to a degree of confusion, an
important aspect of this type of judicial determination lies in its flexibility.
The fact that fourth amendment cases present an infinite variety of factual
circumstances suggests the necessity of limiting holdings to the specific facts
of the case at hand. The case-by-case approach best serves this desired re-
sult. For example, if narrowed only to apply to the facts of the case, the
holding could become more palatable to fourth amendment interests than a
broad "bright line" rule. Numerous situations are easily imagined where
Belton's holding could become overly oppressive toward fourth amendment
privacy rights. 126
The case-by-case approach, coupled with the good faith modification of
the exclusionary rule,' 27 could result in greater protection of fourth amend-
ment rights. A case-by-case analysis under this proposed test would take into
account the various factual circumstances that may arise. The use of the
good faith standard would give law enforcement officials a better idea of
whether their conduct will subsequently be declared illegal. While the pri-
vacy interests of the individual would receive greater protection, the di-
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2172; New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460;
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. at 429.
125. This situation is partially rectified by the "bright line" rule of Ross. Under Belton and
Ross, it is conceivable that the permissible scope of a search under either exception would ex-
tend to the interior and any containers found therein. However whether a search of containers
found within the trunk, is subsequently upheld as legal, will depend totally upon the asserted
justification for the warrantless search. For example, if the search of Ross' trunk and the con-
tainers found there had been argued as a search incident to arrest, under Belton, the search
would have been declared illegal. See State v. Cooper, 636 P.2d 126 (Ariz. App. 1981). The
search of a closed box found on the back seat of an automobile was held invalid under the
automobile exception, in light of the holding in Robbins v. California. The search-incident-to-
arrest exception was not raised. Under this exception, as applied in New York v. Belton, it is
probable that the Cooper court would have upheld the search.
126. The same comment applies with equal force to the Ross decision. What if in Belton,
there were an equal number of arrestees to police officers or handcuffs?
127. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
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lemma of balancing these competing interests might be solved.1 28
C. Impact of Belton on Searches Incident to Arrests in Automobiles
The Belton decision has been applied in several lower court decisions.
Fdr example, in Government of the Virgin Islands v. Rasool,1 29 the Third Circuit
denied a motion to suppress a revolver found in a paper grocery bag located
on the back seat of an automobile. The Court of Appeals upheld the search
as incident to arrest. Finding parallels between Belton and the questioned
search, the Rasool court held that:
[A]ny container, regardless of its opacity, or whether it is sealed,
may be searched if it is found in the interior of the passenger com-
partment of a vehicle after a lawful arrest has been effected. If,
however, the container is not found in the interior or passenger
compartment of the vehicle, but . . . in the trunk. . . then it may
not be opened without a search warrant, unless by its very appear-
ance or distinctive configuration or otherwise, its contents are obvi-
ous to the observer.
130
A recent Utah Supreme Court case, In re KKC.,13 1 demonstrates that
Belton's "bright line" rule does not necessarily clarify the ambiguities of
fourth amendment law, especially with respect to automobiles. In this case,
an officer approached a parked truck with the intention of warning the occu-
pants not to litter. Several bottles of beer and drug paraphernalia were in
plain view. The officer ordered the two occupants out of the vehicle. He
then searched the cab and the bed of the truck. As a result of this search, the
officer found more beer and two bags of marijuana, one of which was in a
cassette tape case.' 32 In upholding the denial of the motion to suppress, the
court found the search to be lawful as an incident to arrest. The court as-
sessed the validity of the search before addressing the issue of the legality of
the arrest.1 33 The record was unclear as to when the arrest occurred; never-
theless, the court found probable cause for the search under the automobile
exception. The Utah court upheld the general search by relying on Belton.
However, the court decided the search of the tape case was not invalid, by
using a Robbins analysis.
134
In People v. Hen y, 135 the Colorado Supreme Court applied Belton, in
denying a motion to suppress a revolver seized incident to an arrest of the
occupants of an automobile. The search commenced after the suspects were
128. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
129. 657 F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1981).
130. Id. at 590. The case exemplifies an attempt at reconciling the decisions in Belton and
Robbins.
131. 636 P.2d 1044 (Utah 1981).
132. Id. at 1045.
133. Id. at 1046.
134. Id. The misapplication of two conflicting lines of analysis points to the possibility that
other courts will also misinterpret Be/ton and Robbbnu.
But see State v. Croft, 635 P.2d 972 (Kan. App. 1981), which exemplifies the ease with
which Belton can be applied. The defendant was arrested for not having a driver's license in his
possession. Subsequent to this arrest, the officer found a radio scanner under the front floor
mat. The Kansas court found that under Belton, the search was proper. Id. at 974.
135. 631 P.2d 1122 (Colo. 1981). This search, conducted at night with a flashlight, was
pursuant to a lawful arrest of the occupants of the automobile.
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handcuffed and placed in a police vehicle. The Colorado Supreme Court
found that the observation of the revolver, in plain view on the floor, oc-
curred moments after the defendant was in custody and still at the scene of
arrest. The court held that Belton mandated denial of the motion to
suppress. 136
The Henry decision exemplifies difficulties that will arise in the applica-
tion of Belton to varying factual circumstances. Heny differed significantly
from Be/ton. The handcuffed arrestees were in the police car, which may
indicate that the principal justifications for a search incident to arrest were
absent. However, the court found no difficulty applying Belton, upholding
this questionable search incident to arrest.
1 37
CONCLUSION
The net effect of the Supreme Court's decision in New York v. Belton is its
emasculation of Ch'mel to the extent that the constitutional definition of the
area within the arrestee's immediate control is expanded. Belton approves
warrantless searches of the interior of an automobile, including any locked or
unlocked containers found within this area, when an arrestee is a recent oc-
cupant. This holding gives arresting officers unlimited authority to search
the interior of an automobile incident to a lawful arrest.
Belton's "bright line" rule will serve as a necessary guideline for law en-
forcement officials while legitimizing intrusions into once protected privacy
interests. The development of this "bright line" rule of constitutional analy-
sis may prove to perpetuate the confusion permeating the fourth amend-
ment, while simultaneously tipping the scales to the advantage of law
enforcement.' 38 The good faith modification to the exclusionary rule ap-
plied concurrently with case-by-case judicial determinations could serve as a
viable alternative to the further use of "bright line" rules. The flexibility of
this method of analysis will serve not only the interests of law enforcement
officials, but also the privacy interests of the individual. This would result in
the balancing of the scales between the two competing interests.
Deborah L. Fres
136. Id. at 1125. In his dissenting opinion in Belton, Justice Brennan hinted at the possibil-
ity of future cases construing Beiton in this manner. "[T]he result would presumably be the
same even if Officer Nicot had handcuffed Belton and his companions in the patrol car before
placing them under arrest and even if his search had extended to locked luggage or other inac-
cessible containers located in the back seat of the car." 453 U.S. at 468 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
137. Id. at 1125. Other recent cases applying Belton include United States v. Cleary, 656
F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Rivera, 654 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1981); People v.
Gomez, 632 P.2d 586 (Colo. 1981).
138. The decision in Ross is further evidence of the curtailment of individual privacy rights
in order to allow law enforcement officials sufficient flexibility.
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